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This paper investigates the distinctive technology protection strategies of entrepreneurial technology 
firms. In contrast with much popular opinion, it is reported that intellectual property features more 
prominently in the business of small entrepreneurial firms than it does in the business of large, 
established mature firms. The intellectual property portfolios of technology firms of all sizes and 
ages exhibit a rich array of instruments in addition to patents for protecting technology, including 
trade secrets, trademarks and copyright, together with licenses to externally sourced technology. The  
intellectual property profiles of technology firms appear to be influenced by their context, 
organizational profiles and corporate goals and by the character of their technology. 
Keywords: Intellectual property, entrepreneurship, trade secrets, patents, copyright, trademarks, 
licensing, bioscience, SMEs, IP profiles. 
1. Introduction: Knowledge, Learning, Intellectual Capital and Intellectual 
Property 
The emergence of the knowledge based view of the firm during the last two decades 
within the academic literatures of management, organization and economics has reflected 
the increasing prominence of knowledge as a key source of wealth creation in society and 
a key source of competitive advantage for firms and regions [Nonaka (1994); Nonaka & 
Takeuchi (1995); Sveiby (1997); Stewart (1999); Jin (2001); Willoughby (2004); Curado 
& Bontis (2006)]. This has led to a steady stream of research on the theme of intellectual 
capital and the related theme of intellectual assets as either complements or substitutes 
for orthodox categories of capital, such as financial capital, physical capital and human 
capital [Edvinsson (1997, 2000); Booker et al. (2008); Tan et al. (2008)]. These trends in 
academic research have stimulated a concomitant interest in the challenges of both 
managing [Quinn (1992); Bontis (1999); Teece (2000)] and measuring [Curado & Bontis 
(2007)] intellectual capital. 
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Under the general conceptual umbrella of managing intellectual capital, a number of 
focus areas of academic inquiry have emerged. One of the most important of these focus 
areas is the role of learning and knowledge transfer in organizations, particularly as it 
pertains to problem solving and product development in competitive technology intensive 
settings. The issue of learning through knowledge transfer has been addressed as both an 
intra-firm issue [Nonaka (1994)] and an inter-firm issue [von Hippel (1988, 1994, 1998); 
Weber (2002, 2003)]. Thus, finding ways to manage intellectual capital so that the 
“stickiness” of knowledge is reduced in order that it may be transferred more quickly and 
efficiently for the purpose of learning has become a central concern of researchers 
operating within the framework of the knowledge based view of the firm. 
The transfer of knowledge between organizations evokes special challenges when 
proprietary rights are involved. When knowledge is “owned”—when exclusive rights are 
attached to knowledge (as is the case with patents, copyright, trade secrets or design 
rights, for example)—the process of transferring knowledge may, according to some 
commentators, be slowed down severely or even blocked [Jaffe & Lerner (2004); Bessen 
& Meurier (2008); Boldrin and Levine (2008)]. Some of the legal requirements for 
gaining intellectual property rights (e.g., employee confidentiality agreements, under 
trade secret law, or prohibitions on publicly sharing information about inventions prior to 
filing patent applications) may also even constrain the internal operations of firms. Thus, 
questions about the characteristics of intellectual property and the management of 
intellectual property arise naturally from research about knowledge, learning and 
intellectual capital [see, e.g.: Williamson et al. (2003); Craig & Moore (2011); Dolfsma 
(2011)]. This paper seeks to contribute to the ongoing debate about this topic by 
exploring the role of intellectual property in the business of entrepreneurial technology 
firms, through both a survey of the pertinent literature and through reporting the results of 
an original empirical study on the subject. It explores the degree to which entrepreneurial 
technology firms engage in the management of intellectual property, the character of that 
engagement and the extent to which the intellectual property profile of entrepreneurial 
technology firms differs from that of large established technology firms. 
The paper investigates what are the typical mixes of intellectual property instruments 
that are selected by managers of entrepreneurial technology firms to protect their firm’s 
technology. To this end, variations in the intellectual property portfolios of firms are 
identified and analyzed over a variety of business dimensions; and contrasts between the 
profiles of entrepreneurial firms and the profiles of large mature corporations are 
examined. Original data collected directly from the managers of bioscience-technology 
firms in the United States—chosen, among other reasons, because of their premier status 
as representatives of the “high technology” sector—form the basis of the analysis. 
As reported in the following pages, the research results reveal that such “high 
technology” firms, across both the size spectrum and the age spectrum, typically follow a 
variegated intellectual property portfolio management approach rather than a 
conventional patent administration approach to protect their technology. In addition to 
patents, the intellectual property portfolios of these firms contain a rich array of 
instruments for protecting their technology, including trade secrets, trademarks and 
copyright, together with licenses to externally sourced technology. The results also 
provide evidence that intellectual property management plays a prominent role in the 
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business of entrepreneurial technology firms. In fact, it appears from the results reported 
in this paper that intellectual property plays a more prominent role in the business of 
small, entrepreneurial technology firms than it does in the business of large, established 
mature technology firms. 
It is suggested that the development of an intellectual property strategy for a 
technology firm is heavily influenced by the firm’s context, its organizational profile, its 
corporate goals and the character of its technology; and that this general principle applies 
to small and young firms at least as much as it applies to large and established firms. 
Thus, the challenges of developing and implementing an intellectual property strategy—
for small and young firms as well as large and established firms—mirror those of 
developing an overall business strategy or corporate strategy, in terms of both the 
complexity of the challenges and the contingencies that may come in to play. 
Why is this an interesting conclusion? As will be discussed in the body of the paper, a 
number of commentators and observers believe that the benefits of intellectual property 
accrue disproportionately to large established firms and that the costs (both direct costs 
and transaction costs) of obtaining intellectual property rights, and of appropriating 
business value from them, work against the interests of small and medium sized 
enterprises. The fact (at least as reported in this paper) that small and medium sized 
enterprises typically invest proportionally more heavily in intellectual property than do 
large established firms, suggests that some popular beliefs about this subject are 
misplaced. The distinctive intellectual property profiles of entrepreneurial technology 
firms, in contrast with those of the large established firms, may provide clues as to how 
entrepreneurial managers go about crafting strategies to match their difficult 
circumstances. 
2. Literature Review: Context 
2.1. The role of intellectual property in technology-intensive business 
Intellectual property has become a prominent theme in academic research, policy analysis 
and policy debates concerning the role of technology in national and international 
economic development [Subramanian (1991); Lehman (1996); Lai (1998); Braga et al. 
(2000); Maskus (2000); Scherer & Harhoff (2000); Shultz & Nill (2002); Granstrand 
(2003); Chen & Puttitanum (2005); Grossman & Lai (2005); Kiskis & Petrauskas (2005); 
Branstetter et al. (2006); Mondal & Gupta (2006); Scotchmer (2006)]. In parallel with 
that trend, scholars and observers of business and strategy have increasingly directed 
attention to the importance of intellectual property within the overall strategic 
management of enterprises [Goto, et al. (2002); Fitzpatrick & DeLullo (2005); 
Parchomovsky & Wagner (2005); Walden 2005; Elmslie & Portman 2006; Kahn 2007; 
Peeters & van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie 2006; Siegel & Shah (2006); Giuri et al. 
(2007); Rose et al. (2007); Blind et al. (2009); Solitander & Solitander (2010)], with 
some [e.g., Pisano & Teece (2007)] even recognizing that firms may sometimes 
consciously seek to influence the intellectual property regime under which they operate 
as a means of building competitive advantage. 
Thus, intellectual property has become a new leitmotif of both economic research and 
research in to the strategic management of business enterprises. In keeping with this 
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development the subject matter of intellectual property is no longer seen as the special 
preserve of the legal profession: intellectual property management now stands alongside 
intellectual property law as an essential complementary modality for the development 
and maintenance of intangible assets [Granstrand (2000); Bosworth & Webster (2006); 
Jolly & Philpott (2009); Kaiser (2010)]. 
2.2. The usefulness of intellectual property to small and medium sized enterprises 
A sub-theme of this broad intellectual development, within both economics research and 
business research, concerns the special relevance of intellectual property to the business 
of entrepreneurial technology firms and to small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) 
more generally [Kitching & Blackburn (1999); Tietze et al. (2006); Greenhalgh & Rogers 
(2007); Blind et al. (2009); Häussler et al. (2009); Lichtenthaler (2009)]. Much of this 
special literature seeks to address the question of whether or not SMEs in the technology 
sector have more to gain from intellectual property rights than larger or more mature 
technology firms, or whether, regardless of whether or not in principle they have more to 
gain, SMEs are in fact disadvantaged vis-à-vis their larger counterparts when it comes to 
obtaining intellectual property protection for their technology, enforcing their intellectual 
property rights or extracting value from those rights. 
While this field of inquiry appears to be a lively and growing domain for research, a 
consensus has not yet appeared in the literature in answer to the foregoing question. 
Much of the investigation and debate relates to the relative impact of variables such as 
technology intensity, industry membership, geographical and legal context, and the 
morphology of firm age or size compared with firm-specific variables such as the 
peculiar management attributes and strategy of individual enterprises. The question of 
just how the approach of small or young technology enterprises to the management of 
intellectual property therefore ought to differ, if at all, from that of large or mature 
technology enterprises, still remains open. 
This paper contributes to the conversation around this sub-theme within business 
research related to intellectual property by seeking to identify the variety of strategies 
between which entrepreneurial technology firms (the vast majority of which tend to be 
young SMEs) may choose when seeking to protect their technology. Rather than 
answering the general question of whether or not the benefits of intellectual property 
rights accrue unevenly between small and large firms, this paper articulates the range of 
protection mechanisms available to entrepreneurial technology firms, the variety of ways 
in which they may be mixed, and the forces that may determine the particular intellectual 
property solution adopted by each firm. In particular, this paper seeks to identify whether 
there is an obvious “best practice” generic intellectual strategy for entrepreneurial 
technology firms or whether, if there is a choice between a diversity of strategies, what 
forces might constrain how an enlightened manager might go about making that choice. 
Contrasts between the behaviors of small or young firms and large or mature firms are 
examined in this paper in an attempt to elucidate what distinctive challenges may be 
faced by the managers of entrepreneurial technology companies for the management of 
their intellectual property. 
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2.3. Contemporary approaches to intellectual property management 
In contrast with the conventional view of intellectual property management for 
technology firms—which tends to focus on patents, patent law and patent 
administration—a number of commentators have recognized that a variety of legal 
devices, methods and rights are available for the protection of a firm’s technology and 
that these protection vehicles need to be managed in the manner of a portfolio of assets 
and rights [Cohen et al. (2000); Greenhalge & Rogers (2007); Blind, et al. (2009)]. 
Typologies of stages of “advanced” approaches to intellectual property management have 
begun to appear in the literature, bringing intellectual property management to the edge 
of the mainstream in strategic management discourse. The following observation by three 
European scholars representative of this new approach is illustrative [Tietze et al. (2006): 
520]: 
IP management systems are becoming increasingly complex and strategic in 
handling an integrated portfolio of IPRs* and intellectual assets rather than just 
“administering” patents, trademarks and copyrights as single, independent assets in 
an operational management way. 
With this perspective in mind, the literature now points to the fact that a wide variety of 
behaviors may be identified between firms in the way that they manage intellectual 
property [Erkal (2004); Greenhalge & Rogers (2006); Giuri et al. (2007); Hanel (2008)]. 
Thus, sophisticated approaches to intellectual property management require recognizing 
both the variety of legal and other vehicles available for protecting a firm’s technology 
and the variety of ways that individual firms might go about configuring a selection of 
such vehicles to match their own unique circumstances. 
How should a manager of an entrepreneurial firm choose an appropriate protection 
strategy for the firm’s technology? What criteria should guide that choice? The answers 
to these two questions will need to be left to a subsequent research. However, in this 
paper it will be possible to investigate what forces appear to drive and constrain the 
decision making process of managers when it comes to intellectual property strategy? 
Insight based upon analysis of such forces may suggest a way forward for future research 
in to normative principles for intellectual property strategy for entrepreneurial technology 
firms. 
2.4. Technological characteristics and intellectual property 
The current literature provides some clues about what we might discover through 
empirical research. Some researchers, for example, have argued that the level of a firm’s 
technology—in other words, the degree to which it is “high tech”—will drive the choice 
of protection strategy [Hanel (2008); Lichtenthaler (2009)]; although this point of view is 
not supported by the results of all published research on the topic [Arundel (2001)]. One 
study has produced evidence that firms in “high tech” industries are faced with higher 
levels of competition than firms in “low tech” industries due to their need to constantly 
renew both their R&D efforts and their intellectual property protection portfolios 
[Greenhalgh and Longland (2005)]. 
 
* Note: “IPRs” is a widely used abbreviation for “intellectual property rights” and “IP” is a widely 
used abbreviation for “intellectual property.” 
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The scale of the technological advance of an invention [Anton & Yao (2004)] or the 
level of inventive-step or non-obviousness of a technological invention [Erkal (2004)] 
have also been raised as determinants of inter-firm variations in intellectual property 
strategy. It appears that the characteristics of a firm’s technology play an important role 
in the adoption of an intellectual property strategy, but the degree to which this is so, the 
manner in which it takes place, and the connection between this factor and other factors, 
is not yet understood. 
2.5. Industry context and intellectual property 
Other researchers [Cohen et al. (2000); Rherrad & Gallaud (2009)] have pointed to the 
industry to which a firm belongs, rather than the nature of its technology, as a factor 
determining its intellectual property profile; and there is some evidence that the impact of 
industry context has an even greater influence on the adoption of intellectual property 
strategy by SMEs than it does for other firms [Olander et al. (2009)]. Of course, there is 
often a close link between the particular industry to which a firm belongs and the 
characteristics of its technology, but this coupling is usually rather loose and there is 
often a great deal of variety in the technological profiles of firms within the same 
industry (for evidence from the biotechnology industry, for example, see Willoughby 
[1992]). Hence, despite their influence on each other, industry factors and technological 
factors may be considered here as distinct, albeit intermingled, factors in the development 
of intellectual property strategy by firms. 
2.6. Firm size and intellectual property 
Nothwithstanding the evidence that has been published suggesting that industry plays a 
signal role, some empirical research has suggested that other factors, such as the size of 
the firm, exert greater influence on intellectual property strategy than industry-specific 
factors [Blind et al. (2006); Jensen & Webster (2006)]. The size of a firm appears to 
influence both the choice of protection vehicles for the firm’s technology and the 
strategic purposes behind its decision to obtain such protection. Kitching and Blackburn 
[1999] have produced evidence that small firms rely upon intellectual property rights to 
protect their technology to a lesser extent than do large firms. This result has been re-
produced independently by others [e.g., Hanel (2006)]. Greenhalge and Rogers [2006] 
have shown, interestingly, that medium-sized firms may be more intellectual property 
intensive than large firms. 
Thus, while there appears to be a connection between the size of a firm and the 
intensity of its reliance upon intellectual property, this relationship does not appear to be 
a simple linear relationship, and it is perhaps moderated by other factors. When the field 
of technology is complex it appears that SMEs may often obtain less benefit from 
intellectual property rights than is typically the case for larger firms [Kash & Kingston 
(2001)]. The results of research in this field that have been published thus far are 
therefore not very robust. 
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2.7. Firm value and the value of intellectual property 
A rich body of literature has emerged in recent years concerned with the valuation of 
intellectual property—especially patents—and also the effect that such valuation has on 
the value of firms [e.g., Barney (2002); Harhoff et al. (2003); Baudry & Dumont (2006); 
Bessen (2008); Lagrost et al. (2010)]. Some of this literature explores differences in the 
relationship between patent valuation and firm valuation according to the size of the firm. 
Bessen [2008], for example, has published evidence that patents issued to small 
(generally young) firms tend to be less valuable than those issued to large established 
corporations. Part of the explanation for this phenomenon may derive from the fact that 
the value of a patent tends to increase significantly if it has been successfully litigated 
[Lanjouw & Schankerman (2004); Bessen (2008)] and that small young firms are 
generally less capable of engaging in expensive and time-consuming litigation to protect 
their patent rights than are large established corporations. On the other hand, there is also 
evidence in the literature that the positive relationship between patent value and firm 
value is stronger for small young firms than it is for large established firms [Greenberg 
(2010)]. While this evidence does not strictly speaking contradict the results of Bessen’s 
work it does reveal that the relationship between patent value, firm value and firm size 
(or age) needs to be addressed from multiple vantage points. 
A related literature has addressed the effect of trading patents on the value of those 
patents and hence on the value of the firms to which those patents belong [Arora et al. 
(2001); Serrano (2005, 2010); Figueroa & Serrano (2010)]. The general conclusion of the 
literature is that, in general, when a patent is traded (i.e., when the ownership of a patent 
is transferred from one person or company to another) its financial value increases. The 
existence of markets for trading intellectual property tends to increase the value of the 
assets in question. Of particular relevance to this paper, however, is the discovery that 
there are apparently size-related differences in the propensity of firms to trade intellectual 
property rights. Serrano’s research  [2010] has shown that small firms are more likely 
than large firms to trade patents; and Figueroa and Serrano [2010] have found that the 
relatively high propensity of small firms to trade patents may be observed in both 
directions: in other words, small firms are more likely than large firms to both sell patents 
and buy patents. 
2.8. Tentative conclusions about the context of intellectual property management 
in firms 
We may conclude tentatively that the size of the firm matters when it comes to 
intellectual property management; but the literature has not yet yielded unambiguous 
evidence about either the strength of that relationship or the character of that relationship. 
Additionally, we may tentatively conclude that the size of the firm matters when it comes 
to enjoying the benefits, including the financial benefits, of intellectual property. Once 
again, however, the relative advantages or disadvantages of size vary according to the 
particular factors under consideration. 
The inter-organizational relationships of firms also seem to influence, or at least 
moderate, their intellectual property strategies, especially when they are R&D intensive 
firms. The degree to which firms engage in cooperative R&D activities with other 
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organizations, especially universities, appears to affect both the choice of legal protection 
vehicles for technology and the frequency of reliance upon intellectual property rights for 
protection of technology [Leiponen & Byma (2009)]. The kind of organizations with 
which a firm interacts and the overall propensity of that firm for interactions with the 
outside world seem to play at least a moderating role if not a determining role in that 
firm’s intellectual property protection practices. 
The existing academic literature in the field of intellectual property management 
provides substantial evidence that the intellectual property protection profiles and 
strategies of firms vary considerably; and it provides substantial evidence that there are a 
variety of forces at work influencing the intellectual property profile of each firm. What, 
then, can be said about the content of decisions made by the managers of technology 
firms and the mixture of elements that make up the intellectual property profiles of firms? 
3. Literature review: Themes and Questions for Empirical Research 
3.1. Diversity in the configuration of intellectual property profiles 
In keeping with the emerging theme identified above of managing a portfolio of 
intellectual property rights and intellectual assets, rather than engaging simply in the 
administration of patents, a growing body of research on intellectual property 
management is directed towards examining the relative merits of alternative forms of 
protection for technology and of technological know-how more generally. In particular, a 
number of scholars have produced indicative evidence and forceful arguments in support 
of trade-secret protection as an alternative to patent protection for technology enterprises 
[e.g., Horstmann et al. (1985); Durvey (1999); Apke (2003); Graves & Range (2006); 
Ann (2007); Ann & Grüneis (2008); Rowe (2008); Stead & Cross (2009); Price (2010)]. 
Despite the fact that trade secret protection has conventionally been portrayed (usually 
with good reasons) by legal practitioners working in the field of technology business as 
inferior to patent protection, evidence is mounting that trade secrets remain prominent in 
the intellectual property portfolios of technology firms [Kitching & Blackburn (1999); 
Cohen et al. (2000); Arundel (2001); Hanel (2008)]. 
3.2. Trade secret rights and patent rights as alternative protection regimes 
In parallel with the wave of criticism leveled at the patent system during recent years 
[e.g., Jaffe & Lerner (2004); Bessen & Meurer (2008); Boldrin & Levine (2008)], and the 
observation by some that the benefits of the patent system are often unattainable for 
many technology firms [Harabi (1995); Kash & Kingston (2001); Leiponen & Byma 
(2009)]—especially when doing business in parts of the world with weak enforcement 
regimes [Lu (2007); Keupp et al. (2010)]—a modest body of literature is now appearing 
in which the possible superiority of trade secret protection over patent protection is being 
asserted, at least for certain classes of firms and certain situations when carefully assessed 
[e.g., Olander (2009); Ann (2010); Price (2010)]. Included among the advantages of trade 
secrets over patents are lower financial costs, no registration requirement, an absence of 
the need to disclose proprietary information to competitors, and the possibility (in 
principle) of permanent protection (unlike patents, which typically expire no later than 20 
years after an application has been filed). 
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A number of studies have been published where patents and trade secrets are 
essentially treated as alternative options between which managers of technology firms 
may choose when seeking to protect their intellectual assets [Beckerman-Rodau (2002a); 
Erkal (2004); Garvey & Baluch (2007); Ann (2007, 2010)]—as opposed to the 
conventional attitude wherein trade secrecy might be viewed as an option of last resort if 
patent protection were, for some reason, not viable. Some authors have adopted this 
intellectual stance in practice-oriented empirical studies [e.g., Kitching & Blackburn 
(1999); Arundel (2001); Hussinger (2006); Leiponen & Byma (2009)] and others have 
adopted it as part of formal economic modeling dealing with intellectual property choice 
[e.g., Horstmann et al. (1985); Anton & Yao (2004); Kultti (2007); Ottoz & Cugno 
(2008)]. 
Information on the procedures and tactics that firms need to adopt in order to ensure 
legal enforcement of trade secret rights is becoming more readily available [e.g., 
Beckerman-Rodau (2002b); Apke (2003); Rowe (2008); Snyder & Almeling (2008); 
Price (2010)]. In short, scholarly work in the field of intellectual property management 
has gone beyond the stage of debating about which of the two forms of intellectual 
property protection—patents rights or trade secret rights—are theoretically superior, as a 
matter of principle, to seeking to understand what choices firms actually make in 
practice, how they make those choices and what forces seem to drive the adoption of one 
option rather than the other. 
What are some of the results that have emerged thus far in academic research about 
the mix of intellectual property protection vehicles—especially patents and trade 
secrets—adopted by firms and the rationale for those particular choices? 
3.3. Trade secrets, patents and the preferences of small and medium sized 
enterprises 
One group of authors has observed through their research that, on the whole, SMEs tend 
to prefer informal (non-registered) methods, typically involving trade secrets, for 
protecting their technology rather than formal (registered) methods, typically involving 
patents [Kitching & Blackburn (1999); Cohen et al. (2000); Hanel (2008); Leiponen & 
Byma (2009); Olander et al. (2009)]; although some [e.g., Arundel (2001)] aver that trade 
secrets are generally preferred over patents regardless of firm size. It is argued that trade 
secrets can provide superior protection to patents under certain conditions, such as when 
the disclosure of technological information as part of the patent system will provide 
undue leverage to competitors [Horstmann et al. (1985)], when the likelihood of parallel 
invention or imitation by competitors is low [Kultti et al. (2007)], when the scale of the 
innovation or the technological advance is large [Anton & Yao (2004)], when the 
appropriability regime is weak [Pisano & Teece (2007); Ann (2010)], when firms are 
unable to obtain access to the necessary resources to obtain patent rights [Kitching & 
Blackburn (1999)], or when firms are developing inventions that require considerable 
work before they will be ready for commercialization [Hussinger (2006)]. 
Some commentators [e.g., Arundel (2001)] treat the patent / trade-secret decision as a 
mutually exclusive choice because the two forms of protection are seen as intrinsically 
incompatible—since patents require disclosure and trade secrets, by definition, are 
destroyed by disclosure. Others, however, recognize that a company’s technology may 
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consist of a variety of complementary technologies, some of which lend themselves to 
patent protection and some of which lend themselves to trade secret protection 
[Horstmann et al. (1985); Beckerman-Rodau (2002a); Erkal (2004); Garvey & Baluch 
(2007); Kultti etal. 2007; Hanel 2008; Ottoz & Cugno 2008; Ann et al. (2011)]—and 
hence that they can either substitute for each other or be mixed as part of an intellectual 
property package. 
Some researchers [Rherrad & Gallaud (2009)] argue that firms in “high tech” 
industries are forced to move fast as a consequence of the intense competition they face 
in their industries and, hence, naturally prefer “secrecy” over patent protection, regardless 
of the size of the firm. Additionally, Olander et al. [2009] have made the interesting 
observation that SMEs have a tendency to focus on the protection of “innovative inputs” 
(which lend themselves to trade secret protection and other complementary managerial 
practices) in contrast to the protection of “innovative outputs” (which lend themselves to 
patent protection) and which, so it is believed, are thus more easily managed by larger 
more resource-rich firms. 
3.4. Questions for empirical research 
The following questions for empirical research are evoked by the ideas, insights, research 
results and debates found in the literature surveyed above: 
• Is there one obvious managerial formula or “best practice” strategy that is adopted by 
the vast majority of firms for the legal protection of technology and for the 
management of intellectual property more generally, or are a wide variety of 
formulae and strategies exhibited by firms? 
• Insofar as a wide diversity exists in the managerial formulae and strategies exhibited 
by firms vis-à-vis intellectual property, may any obvious structure or pattern of 
practices be discerned within that diversity? 
• Is the patent right the dominant type of intellectual property right upon which firms 
rely to protect their technology? 
• How prominent are the positions of trade secrets, copyright, trademarks and other 
forms of intellectual property protection alongside patents in the intellectual property 
portfolios of firms? 
• Are trade secrets (which do not generally require registration) especially preferred by 
small and medium sized enterprises over other forms of intellectual property, such as 
patents, that do require registration? 
• Does intellectual property occupy a more-prominent or less-prominent position in 
the business of small, young entrepreneurial technology firms than it does in the 
business of large, established, mature technology firms? 
• Does the typical intellectual property portfolio of small, young entrepreneurial 
technology firms differ in its profile from the typical intellectual property portfolio 
of large, established, mature technology firms? 
• What are the forces or factors that appear to determine or constrain the intellectual 
property profile of technology firms? 
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The balance of this paper will be devoted to addressing the above questions by reporting 
the results of original empirical research about the behaviors of technology firms vis-à-vis 
intellectual property management. The results are drawn from a ground-up study of firms 
in industries that are preeminent examples of “high technology” industries and that are 
heavily entrepreneurial in nature—the “bioscience-technology” industries in the United 
States. The above eight questions may be condensed in to the following triple question at 
the core of this paper: what practices do firms actually adopt to protect their technology, 
what special shape do these practices take for entrepreneurial firms, and what forces seem 
to influence the adoption of one approach rather than other approaches that, in principle, 
may be available to a firm? 
4. Research Methodology and Data Collection 
4.1. Choice of industry sample: The bioscience-technology industries of the United 
States 
All of the empirical data that were collected by the author during this study came from a 
sample of firms in the bioscience-technology industries in the United States. This 
industry sector was selected because it is replete with excellent examples of the “high 
technology” firms about which much of the literature on intellectual property is 
concerned; yet it is also very diverse in both its technological character and the 
technological intensity of its firms and products. The sector includes not only dedicated 
biotechnology firms (narrowly defined) but also firms active in medical devices 
technology, pharmaceuticals technology, and other fields of technology related to the 
life-sciences (predominantly bio-processing). This group of firms, including dedicated 
biotechnology firms, may be labeled collectively as the “bioscience-technology” sector. 
Additionally, the sector exhibits wide diversity in the morphology of its member firms 
related to size and age.  
The data to be described below were drawn from field-based empirical studies of the 
bioscience-technology industries in the United States during 1996, 1997 and 1998, from 
two states, New York and Utah. The geographical and temporal scope of the data 
collection was chosen partly for pragmatic reasons: because the author was able to obtain 
invaluable financial and practical support for the research from the pertinent industry and 
government organizations in those states during the time period in question. However, 
these two states—New York and Utah—were also chosen for substantive theoretical and 
policy reasons related to the current author’s research about the financial and economic 
dimensions of the “bio” (or “life sciences”) industries. Both states were widely 
recognized as homes to substantial, and growing, bioscience technology industries; but 
they were especially interesting because, despite the fact that they each possessed a 
substantial number of firms in the pertinent fields, they might nevertheless be considered 
as second-tier bioscience technology regions compared with competitor states such as 
California and Massachusetts. This feature made them very interesting from the point of 
view of economic development dynamics and also especially challenging from the point 
of view of entrepreneurial strategy, including financial strategy, in non-dominant regional 
geographic industry clusters. 
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It was possible to obtain data about the intellectual property profiles of firms because 
the data (most of which are highly confidential) were collected as part of a wider regional 
economic study. The types of data that form the heart of this research are simply not 
available from public sources. In short, it was only possible to collect such high quality 
and confidential firm-level data about intellectual property by collecting those data 
alongside other confidential business data being assembled for another research purpose.† 
While the data were generated in the late 1990s they are still relevant since the industries 
from which they were derived remain prime examples of key advanced-technology 
industries of interest to both policy makers and investors. They are also characterized by 
both high degrees of technological entrepreneurship and heavy reliance upon intellectual 
property as an integral aspect of business practice.‡ 
4.2. Data collection method 
The data collection method§ in each state involved two main phases. The first phase, 
which was conducted from July 1996 to December 1996 in New York, and from March 
1998 to June 1998 in Utah, consisted of an exhaustive census of all firms in each state 
active in bioscience technology. To be included in the study a firm had to pass through a 
number of analytical filters: (i) the firm had to be an identifiable bona fide business in its 
respective state, with its core operations located within that state; (ii) its dominant 
activity needed to be centered on at least one of the four sub-fields of bioscience 
technology defined above; (iii) it needed to possess a significant internal technical 
capability of its own within bioscience technology; (iv) it needed to either conduct R&D 
in bioscience technology, produce bioscience technology, employ bioscience technology 
as the dominant part of its business, or produce specialized technical supplies for 
bioscience technology; and, (v) it needed to devote the majority of its efforts to the above 
activities. 
A master list of candidate organizations in bioscience technology was assembled for 
each state from multiple sources, starting with several thousand in New York and just 
under a thousand in Utah. Each organization on this list was subjected to two rounds of 
inquiries: an initial check for information consistency, plausibility and verification as to 
whether or not the organization was still in business or was actually located in its 
respective state; and a second inquiry, conducted mostly by telephone, to identify 
whether the firm could successfully pass through all the analytical filters indicated above 
(this process reduced the candidate list to about 300 firms, in the case of New York, and 
about 125 firms, in the case of Utah). An additional (fine-tuned) analysis of all firms 
which made it through the above two inquiry processes revealed the verifiable industry 
population in New York State to be 273 bioscience technology firms (by May 1997) and 
116 bioscience technology firms in Utah (by July 1998). 
 
† For results of the partner study to this study (an investigation of the finances of the bioscience-
technology industries), including a description of the sample selection and data collection process that produced 
the data for both this study and that study, see Willoughby [2008]. 
‡ For a recent review of the current status and ten-year history of the bioscience-technology 
industries in eleven U.S. states and the U.S. as a whole, see Willoughby [2011]. 
§ Please note that the data collection method (Section 4.2) and the basic characteristics of firms in the 
sample (Section 4.3) are identical to the equivalent sections of the published results of the partner study 
[Willoughby (2008): 8-12]. 
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The second phase consisted primarily of detailed structured questionnaire surveys of 
the population of firms identified in each census. This work involved three sub-phases: 
(i) sending introductory letters (from the appropriate industry associations in each state) 
to every bioscience technology firm in the population identified for each state to 
introduce the study and its purposes; (ii) completing the first half of the questionnaire 
through a structured telephone interview with the CEO (or CEO-equivalent) of each firm; 
and, (iii) completing the balance of the questionnaire by obtaining completed responses 
by fax or mail to a set of printed interview sheets. Data were provided by each of the 
firms under a promise of confidentiality. It was not uncommon for this process to involve 
more than a dozen points of contact (by telephone, fax or letter) between the current 
author or his research assistants and each of the firms being studied.  Data were also 
collected on other matters about which there is insufficient space in this paper to report. 
At the completion of the data collection process in New York during May 1997 
telephone interviews had been completed for 125 firms, and completed interview sheets 
had been received from 96 firms. Comprehensive data sets (both the telephone interview 
and the written fax/interview sheets, combined) were completed for 94 firms. Thus, 
substantial data (covering between 50% to 100% of the items) was assembled for 46% of 
the population; comprehensive data sets (covering close to 100% of the data items) were 
assembled for 34% of the population. Basic identifying data were assembled for 100% of 
the population (273 firms). 
In the case of Utah, detailed questionnaire surveys, covering the vast majority of data 
items, had been completed for 91 firms by the end of July 1998. Thus, the Phase Two 
survey sample constituted over 80% of the population. Complete “Phase One” census 
data (i.e., 100% of the basic identifying data) were assembled for all 116 firms in the 
population (i.e., the sample size for Phase One was 100% of the population size). In 
short, the basic data on Utah’s bioscience technology industry were drawn from a 
completely comprehensive industry census, and the data on details of the behavior and 
performance of the firms were drawn from an extraordinarily high sample size, capturing 
the vast majority of the population.  
The final data set assembled for the analysis below consisted of 184 records of valid 
data, drawn from 93 confirmed bioscience technology firms in New York State and 91 
confirmed bioscience technology firms in Utah. One firm from New York had to be 
deleted from the final sample due to data quality problems, reducing the total from New 
York from 94 firms to 93 firms. 
4.3. Basic characteristics of the firms in the study sample 
Recognizing that not all entrepreneurial firms are necessarily small, and that not all small 
firms are necessarily entrepreneurial, the firms in the sample were divided up in to four 
categories, based upon a combination of their age and size, as pictured in Table 1. 
The average size of the firms in the sample is 146 employees, although about 60% of 
the firms in the sample employ no more than 25 people, and only about 11% employ 300 
or more people. The average age of firms in the sample is just over sixteen years; 
although at the time of the study 47% of the firms had been in existence for no longer 
than ten years and a full 24% had been in existence for no longer than five years. 
Eighteen percent were over 25 years old. Over 65% of the firms in the sample are either 
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small (no larger than 25 people) or young (no older than 5 years). Almost one fifth of 
firms in the sample (17.5%) are classic “start-up” firms (no larger than 25 people and no 
older than 5 years). In short, the bioscience technology industry as represented by this 
data set is predominantly young, small and entrepreneurial, with a significant minority of 
the industry constituted by true start-ups. Despite the fact that the bioscience technology 
industry is predominantly small, young and entrepreneurial, the average annual revenue 
per firm in this data set is over US$35 million, and the average market value of the firms 
is almost US$56 million. 
Table 1. Classification of the Entrepreneurial Status of Firms in the Study (n = 184). 
Age of the Firm 
Size of the Firm ≤ 5 years > 5 years 
≤ 25 people 
Start-up firms 
(17.5% of sample) 
Small established firms 
(42.1% of sample) 
> 25 people 
Large emerging firms 
(6.0% of sample) 
Large established firms 
(34.4% of sample) 
 
The vast majority of firms in the sample (79%) are privately held (i.e., their stocks are 
not publicly traded), and 85% are freestanding, independent firms (i.e., they are not 
subsidiaries of some other company). The majority of firms are therefore, we may infer, 
organizationally free to make strategic decisions. The fact that the industry is dominated 
by privately owned firms rather than publicly traded firms, interestingly stands in tension 
with the overwhelming emphasis in both the popular business press and the academic 
literature on publicly traded firms in what are now widely known as the “life-sciences” 
industries. 
The single largest industry focus of the firms is medical devices technology (52% of 
the sample), with 39% focused on biotechnology, 25% on pharmaceuticals, and 17% on 
bio-systems. The four industry categories are not discrete (i.e., a firm may be active 
simultaneously in more than one industry category) and almost one third of the firms are 
simultaneously active in more than one industry. 
These data confirm that the population of firms that is the focus of this study is indeed 
appropriate for addressing the issues raised in the preceding discussion about the 
management of intellectual property by entrepreneurial technology firms. 
5. Analysis of Data 
All tables and figures included in this paper are original and were produced by the author 
based on the original empirical research reported here. 
5.1. Prominent place of intellectual property in entrepreneurial technology firms 
Managers of the firms included in the study were asked to estimate both the percentage of 
full-time-equivalent employees (i.e., the percentage of total person-hours per year worked 
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by all employees combined “FTE”) and the percentage of the CEO’s time devoted to 
managing intellectual property. On average, across all firms in the sample, 14% of the 
CEO’s time is devoted to managing intellectual property and 11% of FTE employment is 
devoted to the management of intellectual property. These results are broken down in 
Figure 1 according to the entrepreneurial status of each firm as defined in Table 1 above. 
The most striking thing about these results is that intellectual property management 
occupies an extraordinarily large place in the work of the CEOs of the start-up firms 
(firms with no more than 25 FTE employees and doing business for no longer than 5 
years), with the top managers of those firms devoting almost one fifth of their time to 
intellectual property matters. In other words, the CEOs of the start-ups devote double the 
amount of time to managing intellectual property than is the norm for large established 
firms in the bioscience-technology industries. These results are statistically significant (P 
= approx. 0.05). The start-up firms also devote a disproportionately large amount of the 
work-time of their employees to intellectual property: the percentage of total work time 
devoted to intellectual property by start-ups is over six times as great as the amount 
devoted by large established firms. These results are also statistically significant, with an 
almost zero probability that the variations may be explained by chance (P = 0.0005). 
 
 
F = F Ratio from one-way Analysis of Variance calculations. P = probability that the results are not statistically significant. 
Figure 1. Intellectual Property Management Practices of Managers and Employees. 
In contrast to the concern expressed in some of the literature that intellectual property 
protection for technology is largely the “playground” of the larger more established 
firms, the data summarized here show that SMEs—at least those in “high technology” 
industries—are very much engaged in the world of intellectual property. In short, it 
appears that intellectual property occupies a prominent position in the business of small, 
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for large, established, mature technology firms (at least in the typically R&D intensive 
bioscience technology industries). 
5.2. Influence of the enterprise’s context on its intellectual property profile 
5.2.1 Industry context 
Having observed that intellectual property management is at least as important to the 
work of small, young or entrepreneurial firms as it is to the work of larger established 
firms, we will now return to the triple question that lies at the core of this paper: what 
practices do firms actually adopt to protect their technology, what special shape do these 
practices take for entrepreneurial firms, and what forces seem to influence the adoption of 
one approach rather than other approaches that, in principle, may be available to a firm? 
We will begin by looking at the context of the enterprise. As indicators of context we 
will examine both the industry to which a firm belongs and the degree to which it is 
internationally active in its business. The level of internationalization will be examined in 
two complementary ways: the level of formal collaboration between a firm and other 
organizations across international boundaries; and, the level of informal communication 
between the firm’s people and people in organizations outside the home country. 
Figure 2. Industry classification system for bioscience-technology firms. 
Each of the 184 firms included in the sample for this study was classified according 
to which of the following four industry categories it belonged: biotechnology, 
pharmaceuticals, medical devices, and bio-systems. A simplified graphical representation 
of the classification system is provided in Figure 2 that, among other things, illustrates 
that a firm may simultaneously belong to more than one industry group. Indeed, it turned 
Source: Kelvin W. Willoughby. 
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out that almost one third of the firms in this study were simultaneously active in multiple 
industries. Hence, the sum of the percentages of firms in the study sample in each 
industry category is greater than 100 percent. 
Following the basic industry classification exercise, data were then obtained from 
each firm included in the study sample regarding the repertoire of intellectual property 
elements constituting its intellectual property portfolio. In particular, the firms provided 
information on the number of patents, trade secrets, trademarks and copyright-protected 
items (mostly computer software inventions) in their inventory. Additionally, data were 
obtained on the number of licenses or options on licenses held by each firm for 
technology owned by other companies. The results are summarized in Table 2 and, to 
assist interpretation, are standardized relative to the number of people employed in each 
firm. 
Table 2. Variations in intellectual property profiles across industry categories. 
Table 2 reveals considerable variation across industry groups in the manner in which 
intellectual property is configured by firms. For example, firms that specialize only in 
medical devices—without also being active in the “life sciences” (biotechnology and 
other fields, including pharmaceuticals, drawing heavily upon biological science)—tend 
to rely much more heavily than others on trade secrets to protect their technology. On the 
other hand, firms that specialize only in biotechnology—i.e., they practice biotechnology 
without also being active in other industry groups (perhaps we could call these the “pure 
biotechnology firms”)—tend to rely more heavily than most other firms, with the 


























































































Patents 9.7 20.5 14.5 15.5 15.6 7.6 30.4
Trade secrets 34.4 28.5 23.5 37.5 21.2 55.9 27.3
Copyright 
protected items 8.1 10.1 16.0 7.4 11.2 3.1 2.4
Licenses & 
options 6.5 7.0 2.8 6.4 2.3 5.8 9.5
Trade marks 4.0 9.1 4.6 5.4 4.2 2.9 15.8
Number of firms in 
each industry category 71 29 46 22 96 74 31
Percentage of firms in 
each industry category 39% 16% 25% 12% 52% 40% 17%
Number of intellectual property items per 25 people
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medical devices firms—perhaps not surprisingly given their relatively strong reliance 
upon trade-secret protection—exhibit the lowest propensity of all for patent protection. 
The use of copyright as a method for protecting their technology (generally for computer 
software inventions that form part of a complex product or service) appears to be most 
prominent among the firms that are active, in one way or another, within the medically 
oriented industries. Trademarks, interestingly, are used most intensively (measured on a 
per-person-employed basis) by firms active primarily in bio-systems and, to a lesser 
extent, in biotechnology. Finally, Table 2 reveals that bio-systems firms exhibit the 
highest number of intellectual property items per person for all types of intellectual 
property except copyright. It appears, in short, that bio-systems firms are more 
intellectual property-intensive than firms in other bioscience-technology industries. 
Variations across industry groups are also observable in the propensity of firms to license 
in technology from other firms, with bio-systems firms and biotechnology firms being the 
most prominent. 
The industry to which a technology firm belongs appears, on the basis of the evidence 
provided in Table 2, to be an important factor in the choice or determination of its 
intellectual property profile. Industry matters. 
5.2.2 International context 
Another contextual factor—besides industry membership—with potential effects on the 
intellectual property management of a technology firm is the extent to which it is 
internationalized in its business. One way to operationalize the internationalization of a 
firm for the purposes of research is to measure the degree to which it engages in formal 
collaboration (e.g., joint ventures, collaborative research projects or collaborative 
product development) with organizations in other countries. For this purpose an “index of 
international formal collaboration” was calculated for each firm in the study sample by 
counting the total number of organizations in foreign countries (in 8 different 
organizational categories) with which the firm formally collaborated during the most 
recent one-year period. Firms were then divided in to two groups based upon whether 
their index of international formal collaboration was above average or below average for 
the study sample. The average number of items of intellectual property of each type 
possessed by each firm was then calculated for the above-average group and the below-
average group. The results are presented graphically in Figure Three. 
Figure 3 reveals an inverse relationship between the propensity of firms to collaborate 
formally with other organizations internationally and the level of intellectual property 
protection per person. This relationship holds for all categories of intellectual property 
and is statistically significant for all categories except licenses and options on licenses. 
The statistical significance of the relationship is especially strong for trade secrets and 
patents. At this stage we can only speculate about the reasons for this inverse 
relationship. Nevertheless, we can say that there appears to be something about the 
circumstances of technology firms who conduct their business in a relatively self-reliant 
or organizationally discrete manner (internationally) that leads them to protect their 
technology through intellectual property more heavily than other firms. 
Figure 3 also reveals that firms exhibit a general preference—or, at least, a practical 
bias—towards using trade secrets rather patents for the protection of their technology. 
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Among other things, this affirms the observation of other researchers that the old notion 
of intellectual property management mostly being about the “administration of patents” is 
not applicable (if it ever was). It also provides empirical support for those authors cited 
earlier in this paper who assert that trade secret protection ought to be considered as a 
viable, if not sometimes superior, form of intellectual property protection for firms over 
patents. 
Figure 3. Relationship between international formal collaboration and the intellectual property 
profile of firms.** 
The results expressed in Figure 3 also reveal that copyright actually plays a 
significant role in the intellectual property portfolios of technology firms (bioscience-
technology firms, in this case), despite the fact that many commentators assume that 
copyright is mainly only applicable in the aesthetic, artistic and literary industries related 
to music, movies, books or the visual arts. The important place of computer software as a 
component of the products and services of the bioscience technology enterprises is the 
reason for this interesting feature in the data. Computer software is protected by 
copyright in most countries.†† 
 
** Note: In Figure 3 and all subsequent figures “T” is the T Ratio from the calculation of the 
difference of means, assuming unequal variances and, unless otherwise indicated, “P” is the probability that the 
differences between the means are not statistically significant. 
†† See, for example, Article 4 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty, adopted in Geneva on December 20, 
1996 [World Intellectual Property Organization (1996)]: “Computer programs are protected as literary works 
within the meaning of Article 2 of the Berne Convention. Such protection applies to computer programs, 
whatever may be the mode or form of their expression.” The Berne Convention is the Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, adopted at Paris on September 9, 1886, as revised and amended 
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An alternative way to operationalize the internationalization of a firm for the 
purposes of research is to measure the degree to which it’s employees engage in informal 
communication (i.e., personal interactive talking) with people in organizations in other 
countries. For this purpose an “index of international informal communication” was 
calculated for each firm in the study sample by counting the total number of 
organizations in foreign countries (in 8 different organizational categories) which have 
people with whom the firm's employees have engaged in significant informal 
communication during the previous year. Firms were then divided in to two groups based 
upon whether their index of international informal communication was above average or 
below average for the study sample. The average number of items of intellectual property 
of each type possessed by each firm was then calculated for the above-average group and 
the below-average group. The results are presented graphically in Figure Four. 
Figure 4. Relationship between international informal communication and the intellectual property 
profile of firms. 
In most respects the results for intellectual property protection profiles in Figure 4 
follow the overall pattern observable in Figure 3 (with differences in the scale of the 
variations) although, in contrast to the case with formal collaboration, the statistical 
significance of the relationship for informal communication is questionable except for 
patents and licenses. Nothwithstanding these caveats, there is one remarkable feature in 
Figure 4: firms whose people engage in above average levels of international informal 
communication rely upon trade secret protection much more heavily than firms with 
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than average.‡‡ In other words, the more that the firms in the study sample make formal 
arrangements to protect their technology lawfully through the adoption of trade secrets 
the more that their employees exhibit the freedom to talk with people in other 
organizations worldwide (including competitors). 
At first glance this result would seem to be counterintuitive; we would perhaps 
naturally expect a firm that emphasized secrecy as an important part of the protection 
strategy for its technology to likewise discipline its employees to refrain from open 
communication with people from other organizations, for fear that its secrets might be 
lost or compromised. Put another way, we might naturally expect an emphasis on secrecy 
for proprietary technology to undermine a firm’s propensity for open communication, a 
behavioral quality that one would in turn associate with “open innovation.” The facts, 
however, ironically suggest the opposite. 
We can only speculate at this stage about the reasons for this remarkable pattern. It 
seems likely that when firms are sufficiently disciplined to follow the proper procedures 
required under the laws of most jurisdictions to obtain the legal rights associated with the 
protection of technological know-how through secrecy they thereby reduce uncertainty. 
When employees of a technology firm receive explicit and unambiguous instructions 
from their managers about which know-how is to be protected as a trade secret and which 
know-how is not subject to such constraints, employees are then free to talk with 
outsiders without having to worry about whether or not they might inadvertently violate 
their employer’s secrecy policy. 
In short, when a firm’s managers take care to properly follow the administrative 
requirements under law pertaining to trade secrets (e.g., by explicitly defining the trade 
secrets and by providing unambiguous and appropriate notice to employees, visitors and 
research partners, etc.) they create more freedom for their employees. The apparent 
paradox is that, if trade secrets are properly managed accordingly to law, then by placing 
heavier emphasis on secrecy for the protection of technology, the managers of technology 
companies may facilitate more open inter-organizational communication by their 
employees. While it is difficult to speculate about the nature and direction of the causality 
between the various behaviors we can nevertheless observe from the results reported in 
Figure 4 that there is an association between the international connectedness of a firm’s 
people and the level of reliance upon trade secrets for protecting its technology. 
The level of internationalization of a firm’s activities, whether measured by its 
international formal collaborations or its international informal communications, is 
important for a firm’s intellectual property profile. International factors matter. 
In summary, Figures 3 and 4 indicate that the international activity of firms is 
associated with the intellectual property profile of firms. Additionally, as shown by the 
results in Table 2, variations in the profiles and levels of intellectual property protection 
for technology occur along with variations in the industries to which firms belong. 
Context matters. 
 
‡‡ If the trade secret data are expressed as trade-secrets-per-firm rather than trade-secrets-per-person 
then the relationship is statistically significant. The mean number of trade secrets possessed by firms with 
above-average levels of international informal communication is 45.6, versus 16.1 for firms with below-average 
levels of international informal communication (T = 1.683, P = 0.101). 
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5.3. Influence of the enterprise’s organizational profile on its intellectual property 
profile 
Having investigated the relationship between a firm’s context (both industry context and 
international context) and its intellectual property profile we will now look at the 
potential relationship between a firm’s organizational profile and its intellectual property 
profile. As indicators of a firm’s organizational profile we will consider its size, its 
entrepreneurial status and its financial profile. 
5.3.1 Size 
Figure 5 portrays the differences in the intellectual property profile of firms in the study 
sample according to their size. “Small firms” refers to firms with no more than 25 full-
time-equivalent employees and “large firms” refers to firms with greater than 25 full-
time-equivalent employees. As indicated by the results of the T tests, which are also 
reported in Figure 5, the differences are statistically significant for all categories of 
intellectual property, with the exception of copyright (where, while the inverse 
relationship between firm size and the number of intellectual property per person is still 
clearly observable, the P score is relatively large). 
Figure 5. Relationship between the size of firms and their intellectual property profile. 
Several observations are apposite. First, contrasts in the weight given by firms to each 
particular kind of intellectual property protection for technology are significantly more 
marked for small firms than for large firms. Second, the emphasis placed on trade secrecy 
as a form of protection is much greater (in fact, almost 5 times greater) for small firms 
over large firms. This accords with the observation made by a number of authors 
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amongst SMEs. The statistical significance of this result is particularly strong (P = 
0.006). However, while it is true that the data reported here do confirm that small firms 
generally possess more trade secrets rather than patents, the results in Figure 5 do not 
support the dominant view in the literature that small firms place less emphasis on 
patents than do large firms. In fact—and this is the third observation—the small firms 
surveyed in this study also rely more heavily upon patent protection than do large firms 
(when the numbers are standardized as patents-per-person to make comparisons more 
meaningful). Thus, the small firms here (all of which are technology firms) make more 
intensive use of both patent protection and trade secret protection than do the large firms. 
The fourth observation that may be drawn from the Figure is closely related to the third: 
the small firms represented here make heavier use than do large firms of all forms of 
intellectual property (on a per-person basis), not just trade secrets and patents. Thus, it 
appears that when the analysis is restricted to technology firms (as is the case for this 
study), rather than firms from a wide variety of industries regardless of whether or not 
they are technology intensive, small firms are generally more intellectual property-
intensive than large firms. 
Table 3. Correlation matrix: Natural logarithm of firm size and categories of intellectual property. 
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Note: The primary number in each cell is the standard coefficient of correlation (R); the number in parentheses 
is the probability (P) that the correlation is not significant. 
Given the focal concern exhibited in the literature about the relationship between firm 
size and intellectual property, additional statistical analyses were conducted to examine 
the robustness of the relationships illustrated in Figure 5. Correlations between the 
natural logarithm of firm size (in which the size variable is normally distributed) and the 
five intellectual property variables were calculated, together with the probability of 
significance. The results, summarized in Table 3, affirm the results from the comparison 
of means summarized in Figure 5. They also underline the observation from Figure 5 
that, across their intellectual property portfolios, firms tend to treat trade secrets and 
patents as complementary rather than competing forms of intellectual property protection. 
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Additionally, the correlation between the natural logarithm of firm size and the 
“number of IP items per person” (a compound variable which is the simple sum of all 
items of individual of intellectual property in each category for each firm—patents, trade 
secrets, copyright-protected items, trade marks, and licenses and options—divided by the 
full-time-equivalent number of employees in each firm), was calculated for the data set. 
The results, summarized in Table 4, show that there is a statistically significant inverse 
relationship between the size of firms and the aggregate number of intellectual property 
items (of all types) per person. The probability that this relationship is due to chance 
alone is extremely small no matter whether the correlation is calculated using the 
standard coefficient of correlation (P = 0.0009), Kendall’s Tau (P < 0.0001) or 
Spearman’s Rho (P < 0.0001). The result is robust. 
Table 4. Correlation between the natural logarithm of firm size and 
the aggregated number of intellectual property items per person. 
Description of statistic Result 
Number of firms included in calculations (N) 162 
Degrees of freedom (DF) 161 
Mean (IP items per person) 2.634 
Standard deviation (aggregated IP items per person) 5.278 
Minimum (aggregated IP items per person) 0.00 
Maximum (aggregated IP items per person) 41.75 
Lower 95% -0.3969 
Upper 95% -0.1086 
Standard coefficient of correlation (R) 
(Probability (P) in parentheses) 
-0.2585 
(0.0009) 
Kendall’s Tau coefficient of correlation 
(Probability (P) in parentheses) 
-0.3064 
(<0.0001) 
Spearman’s Rho coefficient of correlation 




The general result, which holds true no matter which form of statistical analysis is 
adopted, is that the level of intellectual property protection per person is greater for the 
smaller firms in the study than it is for the larger firms in the study. The size of a firm 
(measured by its employment level) appears, on the basis of the evidence assembled here, 
to be an important factor in the choice or determination of its intellectual property profile. 
Size matters. 
5.3.2 Entrepreneurial status 
A second vantage point from which we may examine the impact of the organizational 
profile of a firm on its intellectual property profile is that of its entrepreneurial status. 
Using the classification system defined in Table 1, each firm was allocated to one of the 
following four categories: start-up firm, small established firm, large emerging firm and 
large established firm. The intellectual property profile of each of the four groups of 
firms was then calculated and plotted as shown in Figure Six. The picture when both size 
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and age is considered together is more complex than the one presented when only size is 
considered. 
Figure 6 shows that small established firms (no larger than 25 people, but older than 
five years) make the most intensive use of intellectual property protection for their 
technology across all types of intellectual property: patents, trade secrets, copyright and 
trademarks. They are also, by a large margin, the heaviest users of trade secrets; it 
appears that as small firms age (moving beyond five years old) they tend to increase the 
relative weight they place on trade secret protection in contrast to patent protection. The 
number of trade secrets per person owned by small established firms is about 6.5 the 
number owned by large established firms. 
 
F = F Ratio from one-way Analysis of Variance calculations. P = probability that the results are not statistically significant. 
Figure 6. Relationship between the entrepreneurial status and intellectual property profile of firms. 
The start-ups (five years or younger and no larger than 25 people) are the second 
most intensive users of intellectual property protection for all categories except copyright, 
where they are the least intensive group. The start-ups are also the most reliant, 
proportionally (calculated on a per-person basis), upon licensing in technology from 
other companies. Figure 6 suggests that when they are very young small firms seek to 
facilitate building up their technological capability by licensing in technology from other 
organizations; but that, after they mature somewhat (perhaps after several years), they 
reduce their reliance upon externally sourced technology in favor of generating their own 
proprietary technology. 
In contrast, Figure 6 suggests that as the large emerging firms (larger than 25 people, 
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their reliance upon externally sourced technology; large firms that are older than five 
years license in technology from external sources twice as heavily (measured as licenses 
per person) than do large firms that are younger than five years. Large emerging firms are 
also relatively intensive in their use of copyright (to protect software inventions). 
As revealed by the F ratios and P values in Figure 6, the statistical significance of 
these results is weaker than for the results based on firm size alone, as discussed above. 
The one exception lies with trade secrets, where the relationship between entrepreneurial 
status and the number of trade secrets per person is clearly statistically significant. 
The entrepreneurial status of a firm (measured by a combination of its employment 
level and its age) appears, on the basis of the evidence provided in Figure 6, to be an 
important factor in the choice or determination of its intellectual property profile—at 
least when it comes to the adoption of trade secret protection as part of its strategy. 
Entrepreneurial status matters. 
5.3.3 Financial profile 
A third vantage point from which we may examine the impact of the organizational 
profile of a firm on its intellectual property profile is that of its financial profile—in 
particular, its expressed strategy for raising the funding necessary to operate. Using 
established concepts from the literature on entrepreneurial finance, the firms in the 
sample were classified as belonging to either a “high-bootstrapping” group or a “low-
bootstrapping” group (for a review of the pertinent literature and for a detailed exposition 
of these terms, see Willoughby [2008]). In contrast to conventional formal sources of 
finance for entrepreneurial technology firms—which include bank loans (private debt) 
and other forms of private debt financing, venture capital investments (private equity) or 
equity capital raised from the public stock markets—“bootstrap” finance is funding for 
the operation and development of a firm that comes from typically low-profile sources 
such as the founders’ personal funds, grants, government loans, “sweat equity” and 
revenue generated by running the business. We could say that bootstrap financing is a 
kind of informal bottom-up approach to financing; and while it has the disadvantage that 
firms following this approach sometimes struggle with the problem of being under-
capitalized (according to the received logic of contemporary financial orthodoxy), and 
hence being forced to run on a “shoe string” (i.e., on a bootstrap), it is often the only form 
of financing available to entrepreneurial technology firms—since both banks and venture 
capitalists are usually not willing to take risks on such early-stage firms. In short, 
technology firms often have no choice but to rely upon bootstrap finance, whatever the 
theoretical advantages of more formal and high-level externally sourced capital 
investment might be. 
Detailed information on its sources of finance was collected for each firm in the study 
sample and the percentage of finance derived from bootstrapping was calculated for each 
firm. Firms that obtained at least half of their funding from bootstrap sources were 
classified as high-bootstrapping firms and the rest were classified as low-bootstrapping 
firms. The intellectual property profiles of each category of firms were then calculated 
and the results were graphed to produce Figure Seven. 
Figure 7 reveals that low-bootstrapping firms embrace patents as a form of 
intellectual property protection for their technology at double the rate at which high-
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bootstrapping firms do so. In other words, relying heavily upon formal “high quality” 
external financing—from venture capitalists, the public markets or banks—is associated 
with a preference for patents. In contrast, the other categories of intellectual property 
(besides patents, and also trade secrets, where the behaviors of high-bootstrapping and 
low-bootstrapping appear to be similar) are embraced more intensively by high-
bootstrapping firms. High-bootstrapping firms also exhibit a stronger tendency to license 
in technology from elsewhere (measured as licenses per person) than low-bootstrapping 
firms. Despite the fact that low-bootstrapping firms are much more patent-intensive in 
their strategies, both low-bootstrapping firms and high-bootstrapping firms actually place 
more emphasis on trade secret protection than patent protection. This observation affirms 
the point of view adopted by a number of the writers reviewed earlier in this paper, and as 
supported by empirical evidence cited in Figure 5 and Table 3, that a firm’s choice of 
patents as a vehicle for protecting its technology is not incompatible with simultaneously 
also making heavy use of trade secret protection. 
Figure 7. Bootstrapping and the intellectual property profile of firms. 
The statistical significance of these results differs between variables, ranging from 
clearly significant in the case of trade marks and copyright, to questionable in the case of 
patents (P = 0.19) and insignificant in the cases of trade secrets and licenses. 
Nevertheless, given that the absolute difference between the per capita reliance upon 
patents of low-bootstrapping firms and high-bootstrapping firms is so dramatic, and 
given that the vast majority of firms in the population are captured in the study sample, it 
would appear prudent to take the differences seriously and to perhaps explore this matter 
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that the financial profile of a firm (measured by whether it adopts a high-bootstrapping or 
a low-bootstrapping approach to financing its operations and development) appears, on 
the basis of the evidence provided in Figure 7, to be an important factor in the choice or 
determination of its intellectual property profile. Financial strategy matters. 
In summary, all three indicators of a firm’s organizational profile analyzed above 
appear pertinent to intellectual property management: Figure 5 (combined with Tables 3 
and 4) indicates that variations in the size of firms are associated with variations in the 
profiles and levels of the intellectual property protection for their technology; Figure 6 
indicates that variations in the entrepreneurial status of firms are associated with 
variations in the profiles and levels of the intellectual property protection for their 
technology; and Figure 7 indicates that variations in the financial profiles of firms are 
associated with variations in the profiles and levels of the intellectual property protection 
for their technology. Organizational profile matters. 
5.4. Influence of the enterprise’s corporate goals on its intellectual property profile 
Having investigated the relationship between the industry context, international context, 
size, entrepreneurial status and financial profile of a firm and its intellectual property 
profile, the role of corporate goals will now be considered. This paper will focus on one 
indicator of a firm’s corporate goals: its level of commitment to the production of goods 
and services rather than remaining primarily a research firm, design firm, investment 
firm, trading enterprise or holding company of some kind. In other words, the firm’s 
engagement in commercialization of “downstream” products and services based on its 
technology will be considered as an indicator of its corporate goals. 
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Figure 8. Relationship between production intensity (% of FTE employees) and the intellectual 
property profile of firms. 
In this paper this factor is measured in two ways: the percentage of a firm’s full-time-
equivalent employees devoted to production activities (including the production of both 
tangible goods and services); and, the percentage of a firm’s annual spending classified as 
COGS (cost of goods sold). In order to operationalize the first of these approaches, all 
firms in the study sample were classified as either those with above-average levels of 
production intensity (i.e., with an above-average percentage of a firm’s full-time-
equivalent employees devoted to production activities) or those with below-average 
scores for the same variable. In order to operationalize the second of these approaches all 
firms in the study sample were classified as either those with above-average COGS or 
those with below-average COGS, based upon financial and accounting data obtained 
confidentially from each firm directly. The intellectual property profiles for each of these 
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Figure 9. Relationship between the intensity of spending on production activities and the 
intellectual property profile of firms. 
The results for Figure 8 and Figure 9 tell a similar story: no matter by which method 
production intensity is measured, whether by the allocation of human resources or by 
spending, the group of firms with above-average percentages of their activities devoted to 
production of goods and services exhibits lower levels of intellectual property protection. 
The obvious exception to this rule seems to lie with trademarks, but only when measured 
according to spending rather than allocation of employee’s time. It also appears that the 
propensity of firms to license in technology from other firms is not affected by their 
production intensity. Despite these qualifications, it appears overall that the more devoted 
bioscience technology firms are to the production of goods and services the less 
intellectual property-intensive they appear to be. As shown by the T ratios and P values 
in Figures 8 and 9, these results are statistically significant for the two most important 
categories of intellectual property for entrepreneurial technology firms—patents and 
trade secrets—regardless of how production intensity is measured. 
In summary, Figures 8 and 9 indicate that variations in the commitment of firms to 
the production of goods and services, whether measured by human activity or financial 
spending, are associated with variations in the levels of the intellectual property 
protection for their technology. Corporate goals matter. 
5.5. Technological influences on the intellectual property profile of an enterprise 
The potential relationship between the characteristics of a firm’s technology and its 
intellectual property profile will now be examined. As indicators of the characteristics of 
a firm’s technology, both its “high technology” orientation (i.e., the R&D intensity of its 
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considered. As a measure of the R&D intensity of a firms’ technology the percentage of 
total full-time-equivalent (FTE) employment devoted to research and development 
activities was obtained for each firm in the study sample. Whether or not each firm in the 
study sample was engaged simultaneously in multiple fields of technology, as defined in 
Figure 2 (specifically, biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, medical devices or bio-systems 
technology), is used here as a measure of the technological complexity of that firm’s 
products and services. The diversity of a firm’s technological undertakings, then, is taken 
here as a proxy for the complexity of that firm’s technology. 
5.5.1 High technology level 
The mean level of R&D intensity for firms in the study sample was calculated and then 
each firm was classified as having either above-average levels of R&D intensity or 
below-average levels of R&D intensity. The intellectual property profiles of each group 
were then calculated and graphed as shown in Figure Ten. 
Figure 10. Relationship between R&D intensity and the intellectual property profile of firms. 
The results in Figure 10 reveal that, on the whole, firms exhibiting above-average 
levels of R&D intensity are more intellectual property-intensive than those exhibiting 
below-average levels of R&D intensity. This pattern is especially marked for trade 
secrets and patents, with trade secrets in particular standing out. Use of trade secrets to 
protect their technology is over three times greater (on a per-person basis) for firms with 
above-average levels of R&D intensity than it is for firms with below-average levels of 
R&D intensity. The equivalent ratio for patent protection is significantly greater than 
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statistically significant for both patents and trade secrets, which are arguably the two 
most important categories of intellectual property for entrepreneurial technology firms. 
Trademarks are the exception here, where firms with below-average levels of R&D 
intensity exhibit several times the level of use of trademarks per person than do firms 
with above-average levels of R&D intensity. However, this result ought to be treated with 
caution, as the difference between the means is not statistically significant. There does 
not appear to be any significant difference between the in-licensing behavior of firms 
according to which group they belong. 
5.5.2 Technological complexity 
The potential impact of a firm’s level of technological complexity on its intellectual 
property profile will now be considered. The intellectual property profile was calculated 
for both the group of firms with high technological complexity and the group of firms 
with low technological complexity. The results were then graphed as shown in Figure 
Eleven. 
The results reveal that the level of technological complexity—at least as measured in 
this study—appears to have only a marginal, and statistically insignificant, effect on the 
propensity of firms to obtain either trade secret protection or patent protection. It also has 
no significant observable effect on the propensity of firms to make use of trademarks 
(measured on a per-person basis). 
The exception to this overall result lies with copyright and licenses. The firms with 
above-average levels of technological complexity own almost twice as many copyright 
protected items per person than the firms with below-average levels of technological 
complexity. We can only speculate here as to the reasons for this result; and our 
conclusions ought to be tempered by the relatively low probability of statistical 
significance. Nevertheless, a plausible explanation would appear to be that the greater the 
complexity of a firm’s technology the heavier its reliance upon software technology 
becomes; and, hence, the heavier its use of copyright protection for software, in its 
various guises, becomes. Firms with high levels of technological complexity also tend to 
license in the technology of other firms more heavily than those with lower levels of 
technological complexity. Presumably this is because the complexity of their technical 
repertoires generates a degree of reliance upon external sources to fill technological gaps 
in their systems and products. Technological complexity, we may conclude, does have an 
effect on the intellectual property profiles of firms, but only to a limited extent related to 
the protection of computer software and the licensing in of others’ technology. 
In summary, Figure 10 indicates that variations in the R&D intensity of a firm’s 
activities (i.e., the “high technology” level of a firm) are associated with variations in the 
profiles and levels of the intellectual property protection for their technology. 
Additionally, as shown by the results in Figure 11, variations in the complexity of 
technology between firms (namely, the diversity of their technological repertoires) also 
affects their intellectual property profiles. This relationship, however, is notable only for 
copyright and licensing behavior. Technological complexity appears to have some 
influence, albeit limited and irregular, on the intellectual property character of a firm. The 
character of a firm’s technology, especially the level of R&D input to the technology, and 
to some degree also its complexity, is important. Technology matters. 
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Figure 11. Relationship between technological complexity (diversity) and the intellectual property 
profile of firms. 
6. Conclusions and Implications 
6.1. Main conclusions from the empirical research 
The first major conclusion to be drawn from the empirical results reported in this paper is 
that intellectual property plays a very prominent role in the work and business of small, 
young and entrepreneurial technology firms—at least those in the bioscience technology 
industries. The time devoted to managing intellectual property, of both managers and 
employees more generally, is greater for the small firms and young firms (i.e., the firms 
typically labeled as “SMEs”), than it is for the large mature firms. Furthermore, in 
contrast to the perspective adopted in much of the literature—wherein intellectual 
property protection is seen as the preserve of large firms, while non-legal and non-formal 
protection methods such as first mover advantage or stealth are seen as the natural 
preserve of small firms—this study has shown that small technology firms actually make 
greater use of formal intellectual property rights than do large firms (when the data are 
standardized objectively on a per-person basis). 
The second major conclusion to be drawn here is that technology firms—at least 
technology firms in the bio-related industries—tend to follow an intellectual property 
portfolio management approach rather than a conventional patent administration 
approach. Firms of all sizes and types tend to balance and configure the use of all forms 
of intellectual property protection, including patents, trade secrets, copyright and 
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technology. The management of intellectual property portfolios appears to be a signal 
aspect of the strategic management of entrepreneurial technology firms. 
The third major conclusion to be drawn here is that there is considerable diversity in 
the intellectual property profile of technology firms. The managers of technology firms 
appear to be constrained in their decision making by a number of forces and factors—
especially if their firms are internationally active (which almost all of them are)—that 
make their job of designing an appropriate intellectual property strategy rather difficult. 
There does not appear to be any obvious “one best way” or simple strategic formula for 
configuring a firm’s intellectual property portfolio. 
The fourth major conclusion to be drawn here is that trade secret protection, rather 
than patent protection, more often than not occupies the primary position in the 
intellectual property portfolios of firms. This heavy reliance upon trade secret protection 
is observable as part of the strategies of all categories of firms, including large 
established firms; but it is especially noticeable in the strategies of small firms, young 
firms and entrepreneurial firms more generally. 
The final major conclusion is that the mix of intellectual property instruments 
adopted by firms for the protection of their technology appears to be influenced by the 
context, organizational-profile and goals of the technology enterprise, together with the 
characteristics of the pertinent technology. 
6.2. Implications for theory 
The core theme expressed by the majority of sources in the literature surveyed in the 
early part of this paper—that intellectual property and the management of intellectual 
property have great importance for both economic development and the strategic 
management of business enterprises—is affirmed by the research reported here. The 
secondary theme in the literature—that intellectual property has special implications for 
the business of entrepreneurial technology firms and small and medium sized enterprises 
(SMEs) more generally—is also affirmed by the research reported here. However, calling 
these insights “theoretical” insights may be a little presumptuous. At this stage we should 
probably say that the literature is mostly descriptive and investigative rather than truly 
theoretical in nature. The main implication of this research for theory, therefore, is that 
the time has probably come for some kind of formal theory to be developed in intellectual 
property management research. 
Nevertheless, notwithstanding the caveat that the research here mostly takes the form 
of practice-oriented investigations in search of theory, some promising suggestions for 
the future challenge of theory development are contained in the results summarized in 
this paper. Evidence is provided here that there are at least four sets of factors involved in 
the configuration of a technology firm’s intellectual property profile: (1) organizational 
context, (2) organizational profile, (3) corporate goals, and (4) the characteristics of the 
organization’s technology. How might these factors be organized conceptually and 
elaborated within a more systematic theoretical framework? Will orthodox theories from 
the field of strategic management be adequate for this purpose or will some new theory—
perhaps grounded in epistemology, the philosophy of technology or in the legal 
philosophy of property rights, for example—need to be developed? The four factors that 
this paper has identified as playing a role in determining the intellectual property profiles 
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of technology firms will probably already be familiar to scholars of organization studies 
and strategic management. This suggests that, while there are no doubt some peculiar 
features intrinsic to the subject matter that must be included in research about intellectual 
property strategy, there will be utility in articulating established theory from organization 
studies and strategic management research for application in the general domain of 
intellectual property management studies. 
Finally, the complexity and variety of approaches to configuring intellectual property 
protection for a firm’s technology identified in this research raise the question of whether 
there is an almost infinite variety of peculiar intellectual property strategies available to 
firms to match the peculiar features of each individual firm’s circumstances, or whether a 
modest number of generic strategies might be articulated between which the (probably 
perplexed) managers of entrepreneurial technology firms might choose? 
These theoretical challenges will need to be left for future projects. 
6.3. Implications for future research 
The investigations described in this paper took place in the mode of inductive research 
rather than deductive research. To the extent that theory (or proto-theory) played a role, 
the inquiry was conducted in search of theory rather than as the application of theory. 
Additionally, as the situation might be described using the language of academic 
economics, we could say that the research results presented here are primarily positive 
rather than normative. 
The main challenge for the next phase of research is therefore to identify normative 
principles that may form the basis for robust strategy prescriptions. The four sets of 
factors identified in this paper as being associated with the intellectual property profiles 
of technology firms provide clues for normative research. Could a limited set of generic 
intellectual property strategies be designed for entrepreneurial technology firms based 
upon a heuristic framework derived from systematic analysis of those four sets of 
factors? Doing so would be a worthwhile challenge for future research. 
In addition to the challenges for normative research further positive research also 
remains to be conducted. There was insufficient space in this paper to systematically 
explore the complex relationships of the various factors associated with the intellectual 
property profiles of firms or to develop formal causal models of such relationships. 
Future research should address both of these shortcomings. 
6.4. Implications for managerial practice 
Managers of entrepreneurial technology firms are faced with the challenge of how to 
design an intellectual property protection portfolio for their technology as part of a wider 
intellectual property strategy for the firm. Building such a portfolio requires much more 
than assembling a set of patents across various jurisdictions. Rather, it requires artfully 
combining a mixture of patents, trade secrets, trademarks and copyright—among other 
types of legal protection—together with judicious in-licensing of externally sourced 
technology. One of the special managerial challenges is to locate practical decision-
making criteria for designing the optimum configuration for the distinctive circumstances 
of each enterprise. 
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Thus far, the academic literature does not offer managers a robust, practical and 
simple formula, or a standardized rubric, for making such intellectual property related 
decisions. However, the research results of the project summarized in this paper suggest a 
point of view, and a set of factors, that managers may bear in mind while approaching 
such decisions. This may be summarized in list form as follows: 
• Organizational context matters 
− the industry context matters 
− the international context matters 
• Organizational profile matters 
− the size of the firm matters 
− the entrepreneurial status of the firm matters 
− the financial profile of the firm matters 
• Corporate goals matter 
− the level of commitment to the production of goods and services matters 
(the levels of both human and financial resources devoted to production matter) 
• Technology matters 
− the R&D intensity (i.e., “high technology” level) of a firm’s technology matters 
− the complexity of a firms technological repertoire matters. 
For now it would be unwise to prescribe anything precise about the relative weights or 
priorities of the above factors or about the sequences in which they should be considered. 
Rather, the research reported here suggests that a manager of a technology firm should 
take these factors in to account thoughtfully while artfully configuring an intellectual 
property portfolio appropriate for his or her firm. 
Finally, the most significant conclusion of this paper is that in future research and 
policy making it is important to recognize that intellectual property features 
proportionally more prominently in the business of small entrepreneurial firms than it 
does in the business of large, established mature firms. 
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